Executive Summary:
- On June 19, the Taliban claimed cross-border strikes on Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) hideouts in Pakistan, a claim Pakistan dismissed as propaganda and countered that ISKP militants actually operate from within Afghan territory.
- These mutual accusations have fueled a cycle of military escalation, with Pakistan conducting multiple airstrikes inside Afghanistan targeting alleged militant sanctuaries.
- International mediation efforts have not produced a durable diplomatic settlement. This mutual distrust and lack of border coordination allow ISKP to easily exploit ungoverned spaces for continued transnational activity.
On June 19, the Taliban regime’s Defense Ministry claimed its forces “targeted and struck hard” at centers of Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces (X/@MoDAfghanistan2, June 19). Pakistan promptly denied the claim and described it as propaganda. If confirmed, however, the operation would mark the first publicly claimed Taliban cross-border strike against ISKP targets in Pakistan since the May ceasefire.
Taliban Claims ISKP Bases in Pakistan
ISKP has claimed responsibility for multiple deadly attacks inside Afghanistan since the Taliban seized power in 2021. The Taliban regime has repeatedly claimed that it has defeated ISKP inside Afghanistan, while accusing the group of maintaining bases in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces and using those locations to organize cross-border attacks. Pakistan has consistently denied those allegations. According to the Taliban Defense Ministry statement, the sites it targeted were allegedly used with support from “certain hostile intelligence circles” to plan and coordinate attacks against Afghanistan. The statement appeared to allude to Pakistani intelligence agencies. The Taliban did not, however, provide evidence to substantiate the claim.
The Taliban claimed that its forces struck locations in the Gulistan area of Qila Abdullah district and the Shakar Ab Gardi-Jungle area of Chagai district in Balochistan, as well as the Qamber Khel area of Orakzai district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The statement asserted that the targeted hideouts were frequented by several key ISKP leaders, but it did not identify any senior figures killed in the operation (X/@MoDAfghanistan2, June 19).
Pakistan’s Reaction
Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting called the Taliban’s claim “fake and nefarious.” The Ministry countered that camps belonging to ISKP and more than “two dozen” other militant organizations are located, run, and sponsored from inside Afghanistan (X/@FactCheckerMoIB, June 19). The Taliban regime has, however, frequently denied Pakistani allegations that Afghan territory is used by militants to attack Pakistan.
Prior to the reported June 19 Taliban strikes on ISKP in Pakistan, mutual accusations had already led to military escalation. Pakistan had carried out airstrikes inside Afghanistan since at least October 2025 against alleged militant sanctuaries. The most recent strikes before the Taliban’s June 19 claim occurred on June 10, in Afghanistan’s Kunar, Khost, and Paktika provinces. Pakistani Information Minister Attaullah Tarar claimed that 26 “terrorists” were killed by Pakistan (X/@TararAttaullah, June 10). The Taliban regime, by contrast, counter-claimed that 13 civilians, including children, were killed.
The cycle of cross-border escalation continued after the Taliban’s June 19 claim. On June 28, Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Paktya, Paktika, and Kunar provinces. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) confirmed that at least 28 civilians were killed and 49 injured, including women and children, while Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting confirmed that Pakistani security forces had conducted strikes in the three provinces (UNAMA, June 29). In early August, Pakistan’s military rejected broader UN findings on civilian casualties from Pakistani operations in Afghanistan, maintaining that its strikes targeted militant hideouts and were conducted in self-defense (CTPost, July 31).
It remains unclear how the Taliban may have carried out strikes inside Pakistan on June 19. Afghanistan has lacked combat aircraft since the collapse of the U.S.-backed Afghan republic and the international withdrawal. The Taliban has only a small air inventory, including six aircraft and 22 helicopters of uncertain operational status, although Taliban forces have used drones during clashes with Pakistan (Reuters, March 17). The Taliban had also previously claimed drone strikes against targets in Pakistan amid intensifying cross-border tensions (Reuters, February 27).
There are no verified reports on how the Taliban regime acquired its drones. Ahmad Zia Saraj, former director general of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), claims, however, that the Taliban mostly “purchase drones from open markets.” In an interview with Afghanistan International, Saraj asserted the Taliban modified these commercially available drones to carry explosives (Afghanistan International, June 20; X/@TKCKhyber, June 23).
Search for a Settlement
Former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad has frequently commented on Afghanistan–Pakistan military escalations. He has urged both countries to pursue diplomacy and reach an agreement under which neither side allows groups or individuals on its territory to threaten the other country’s security (X/@realZalmayMK, June 19).
The conflict has also disrupted trade and civilian movements across the Durand Line. The People’s Republic of China, Türkiye, and Qatar have attempted to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan and encourage both sides to address each other’s security concerns. No durable settlement has been reached, however, and the conflict continues to affect border communities, commerce, and regional security.
Pakistan says it is ready to engage the Taliban regime diplomatically but wants guarantees that Afghan soil will not be used for militant attacks in Pakistan. Tahir Andrabi, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, told a news conference that Islamabad wants “verifiable commitments” from the Afghan side that militants allegedly operating from across the Durand Line will no longer kill Pakistani nationals (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, June 24). The Taliban’s Foreign Ministry has not yet responded to Pakistan’s latest demand.
Conclusion
The Taliban’s claimed June 19 strikes against ISKP targets in Pakistan, if confirmed, would represent a notable escalation in the Afghanistan–Pakistan security dispute. They also demonstrate how ISKP has become both a direct security threat and a point of diplomatic contention between Kabul and Islamabad. The Taliban’s claim that ISKP operates from Pakistani soil and Pakistan’s counterclaim that IS-K and other militant groups operate from Afghanistan reflect a deepening cycle of accusation and retaliation.
Indeed, on June 17, Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) captured a suspected senior Islamic State operative, Ahmet Kazanci, also known as “Abu Ubeyde” and “Abu Ibrahim,” and rendered him to Türkiye. The operation targeted the ISKP media wing, and Turkish security sources alleged Kazanci had traveled from Türkiye to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, joined ISKP, and played a role in the group’s camps (Anadolu Agency, June 17). The case underscored the transnational dimensions of ISKP’s recruitment, media, and logistics networks in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region and beyond.
Unless both sides establish credible mechanisms for intelligence sharing, border de-escalation, and commitments not to support or tolerate cross-border militant activity, tensions are likely to persist. ISKP may benefit from this environment by exploiting ungoverned spaces, mutual distrust, and the lack of coordinated counterterrorism efforts across the border.
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